Bioterrorism-related Inhalational Anthrax in an Elderly Woman, Connecticut, 2001 by Griffith, Kevin S. et al.
On November 20, 2001, inhalational anthrax was con-
firmed in an elderly woman from rural Connecticut. To
determine her exposure source, we conducted an exten-
sive epidemiologic, environmental, and laboratory investi-
gation. Molecular subtyping showed that her isolate was
indistinguishable from isolates associated with intentionally
contaminated letters. No samples from her home or com-
munity yielded Bacillus anthracis, and she received no first-
class letters from facilities known to have processed inten-
tionally contaminated letters. Environmental sampling in
the regional Connecticut postal facility yielded B. anthracis
spores from 4 (31%) of 13 sorting machines. One exten-
sively contaminated machine primarily processes bulk mail.
Asecond machine that does final sorting of bulk mail for her
zip code yielded B. anthracis on the column of bins for her
carrier route. The evidence suggests she was exposed
through a cross-contaminated bulk mail letter. Such cross-
contamination of letters and postal facilities has implica-
tions for managing the response to future B. anthracis–con-
taminated mailings.
O
n November 19, 2001, a suspected case of inhalation-
al anthrax in a 94-year-old woman was reported to the
Connecticut Department of Public Health (CTDPH) (1–3).
This was the first case of Bacillus anthracis infection
reported to the CTDPH since 1968 and the eleventh inhala-
tional anthrax case in the United States since October 4,
2001 (1–6). The patient’s symptoms of fever, fatigue,
malaise, dry cough, and shortness of breath began 20 days
after the last confirmed inhalational anthrax patient
became ill and 36 days after the last known intentionally
contaminated letters, addressed to U.S. Senators Thomas
Daschle and Patrick Leahy, were postmarked in Trenton,
New Jersey (1–4) (Figure 1).The patient in Connecticut
was not in the known categories of intentionally contami-
nated letter recipients and was not a postal worker or a
mailhandler (1,5). This report describes the epidemiologic
and environmental investigation conducted to determine
whether her case was related to the other bioterrorism-
related cases; whether she was the only case in
Connecticut or a sentinel of a larger outbreak; and the
source, place, and time of her exposure. The clinical
aspects of the case have been described (2,3).
Methods
Isolate Comparison
A subculture of the patient’s B. anthracis blood culture
isolate was examined for species confirmation, antibiotic
susceptibility testing, and molecular subtyping by multi-
ple-locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis, which
examines eight loci on the B. anthracis genome (7,8). The
isolate was compared with previous bioterrorism-related
isolates on the basis of antibiotic susceptibilities and
molecular subtyping.
Surveillance
We conducted retrospective surveillance for additional
cases of human or animal anthrax in Connecticut for
September 1 to November 30, 2001, by using data from
death certificates; medical examiner, laboratory, and postal
worker absentee records; and surveys of licensed veteri-
narians. We conducted prospective surveillance for addi-
tional cases of human or animal anthrax in Connecticut
from November 20 to December 21, 2001, by using reports
from hospital admissions, laboratories, healthcare
providers, veterinarians, and animal control officers, and
also reports from the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) on
employee absenteeism (9,10).
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In collaboration with local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies, we identified the patient’s activi-
ties, home visitors, and all places she visited in the 60 days
preceding her symptom onset using her personal calendar
and interviewing her family, friends, neighbors, physi-
cians, and persons who cleaned her home. We also met
with investigators of the 10th inhalational anthrax case
from New York City to assess similarities between the two
cases. 
Patient Environmental Investigation
In the patient’s home, environmental samples and
selected personal effects were collected for culture during
eight inspections conducted from November 20 to
December 4. We obtained swab and wipe samples from
clean, nonporous surfaces and vacuum samples from large
or dusty nonporous or porous surfaces (11). Surface swab
samples were collected by using synthetic swabs mois-
tened with sterile saline or sterile water to sample such sur-
faces as vents; furniture; appliances, including vacuum
cleaners; areas with dust; electrostatically charged sur-
faces, including a television screen; aerosolizing and mist-
ing devices, including an inhaler and a perfume bottle; and
all places in the home where she might have handled her
mail. Vacuum samples were collected by using high-effi-
ciency particulate air (HEPA) vacuum cleaners equipped
with a filter collection device to vacuum carpets, furniture,
and clothing. Final intensified sampling was performed by
using blowers to aerosolize particles throughout the living
space, followed by air sampling that used high-volume air
filtration devices and the placement of blood agar settle
plates throughout the home. Personal effects collected
from the home included pieces of mail, file folders, pieces
of paper, used tissues, letter openers, pill bottles, an
inhaler, photographs, and a calendar. Bulk samples of con-
tents from the bags of vacuum cleaners normally used to
clean the home were collected for culture. Nasal swabs
were taken from all persons who spent >60 minutes in the
patient’s home during the 60 days before onset of her
symptoms.
Outside the home, environmental samples were collect-
ed for culture from November 20 to December 2. We col-
lected moist swab and vacuum samples from all indoor air
spaces she had visited in the 60 days preceding her symp-
tom onset. Moist swab samples were also collected at
selected outdoor locations, including her mailbox and the
soil around it, mailboxes on her street, soil in her yard, and
soil at a local establishment rumored to be located on the
site of a previous farm that was closed because of an
anthrax outbreak among cattle during the early 1900s.
Postal Epidemiologic Investigation
USPS has a mail tracing system by which data are
recorded from bar codes applied to letters in postal pro-
cessing and distribution centers (PDCs). For first-class let-
ters, canceling machines apply both an identification code
(orange bar code on the back of the envelope) and a post-
net code (black bar code on the front of the envelope) to
envelopes. Bulk letters are not processed on canceling
machines because they are presorted with the postnet code
preapplied. When the identification code is used, canceling
machines record the day of the month, the time of day, and
the sequence in which each first-class letter was processed
during a given half-hour interval. Sorting machines then
use the postnet code to group both first-class and bulk let-
ters that go to a particular address. Sorting machines
record the total count of all letters processed on each sort-
ing machine, but only first-class letters with identification
codes include time of day and identity of the particular
sorting machine. Consequently, identifying information on
bulk letters is not recorded in the mail tracing system. All
letters are processed on sorting machines approximately
two to five times, progressing from an initial sort, to the
five-digit zip code, through a specific final sort in which
letters are sorted to collecting bins in the delivery sequence
for the given postal carrier route (12). 
We searched the patient’s home for letters she received
since September 1, 2001, and recovered letters from her
office, personal files, and trash bins. The recovered letters
were categorized as first-class or bulk and submitted to the
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Figure 1. Bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax cases by week
of symptom onset—United States, 2001.The first two cases of
inhalational anthrax occurred in Florida. Though no direct expo-
sure source was found, environmental samples of the media com-
pany in which these two patients worked and the postal facilities
serving the media company yielded Bacillus anthracis spores
specifically implicating a B. anthracis–containing letter or package
(4): †, the letters to Senators Thomas Daschle and Patraick Leahy
were postmarked in the Trenton, New Jersey, processing and dis-
tribution center on October 9, 2001;  indicates a case of inhala-
tional anthrax in a person with direct exposure to a B.
anthracis–containing letter;  indicates a case of inhalational
anthrax in a person with no known B. anthracis exposure. CTDPH laboratory for culture. First-class letters were
checked against the USPS database for date and location of
cancelation. To determine whether the patient received
first-class letters from any PDCs that processed an inten-
tionally contaminated letter (i.e., Trenton, NJ; Brentwood,
Washington, DC; Morgan, New York City; and West Palm
Beach, FL), we examined USPS data of outgoing mail
from these facilities for first-class letters with Connecticut
destination addresses. Data were reviewed from October 9
until either the date the particular PDC closed because of
B. anthracis contamination or, if the PDC did not close, the
date the patient’s symptoms began (November 13). We
chose October 9 as a starting date because the only recov-
ered intentionally contaminated letters that resulted in
cases of inhalational anthrax were postmarked on this date
and because 36 days had already elapsed between this date
and the onset of the patient’s symptoms. Information on
the date, time, and machines involved in processing these
first-class letters was retrieved. 
To identify all first-class letters the patient received,
regardless of point of origin, we examined USPS data for
first-class letters sorted in the Southern Connecticut PDC
that served her local post office from October 9 to
November 13. We retrieved available information on the
date, time, and identity of a letter’s originating PDC; how-
ever, information on the machines that processed a partic-
ular letter in the originating PDC is not available. To check
for bulk letters sent to the patient’s zip code from October
9 to October 16, 2001, we contacted mailing companies
that used the Trenton PDC. 
Postal Environmental Investigation
Environmental samples were collected at the Southern
Connecticut PDC on five occasions. On November 11,
2001, 2 days before the patient’s symptoms began, an inde-
pendent contractor took surface samples from various
locations with dry synthetic swabs as part of a nationwide
USPS effort to identify contamination of selected PDCs.
On November 21, a second independent contractor hired
by USPS collected additional dry swab samples of sur-
faces, including 29 letter-canceling and -sorting machines,
4 flat- (magazine) sorting, and 4 parcel-sorting machines;
air-handling units; and vacuum cleaner filters from differ-
ent facilities. On November 25, we inspected and repeated
sampling of similar locations using moist synthetic swabs.
On November 28, guided by findings from epidemiologic
investigations at the Brentwood PDC, we collected vacu-
um and moist synthetic 2x2-inch surface wipe samples
from all letter-canceling and -sorting machines (13). After
samples from three letter-sorting machines were positive
for B. anthracis, we collected additional moist surface
wipe samples from each column of collecting bins on the
three letter-sorting machines with samples yielding B.
anthracis and from the sorting machine that completed the
final sort of letters that included the patient’s mail carrier
route. We also collected nasal swabs for culture from
employees of the Southern Connecticut PDC during
November 21 to 24. 
At the patient’s local post office, we obtained dry and
moist synthetic surface swab and vacuum samples of the
mail-sorting area, computer screens, gurneys, carts, load-
ing dock, and vehicle serving her postal carrier route on
four occasions during November 21 to December 2, 2001.
We collected nasal swabs for culture from employees of
her local post office during November 21 to November
24.
Postal Laboratory Studies
All environmental samples were tested either in the
CTDPH laboratory or, when it had reached its capacity, a
contract laboratory in Texas. Surface swab, nasal swab,
and vacuum samples and blood agar settle plates were ana-
lyzed in the CTDPH laboratory. Surface wipe, vacuum,
and air-filter samples, and bulk contents of vacuum clean-
ers were analyzed in the contract laboratory in Texas. All
swab specimens were plated directly onto sheep blood agar
and handled using standard procedures (14). Vacuum, air-
filter, and surface wipe samples, as well as vacuum clean-
er bag contents, were processed with the following extrac-
tion procedure: the specimen contents were placed into a
sample-processing solution and centrifuged to create a pel-
let; the pellet was resuspended in 0.3% Tween 20 in phos-
phate-buffered saline; the resuspended solution was then
heat-shocked; and one tenth of the resuspended solution
was placed on sheep blood plates (14). All suspicious
colonies were screened by Gram stain and motility testing
and confirmed by gamma phage lysis and polymerase
chain reaction (14). All samples from the patient’s home
that underwent the extraction procedure and tested nega-
tive were retested with one half of the remaining sample-
processing solution.
Results  
Isolate Comparison and Surveillance
Molecular subtyping results identified the isolate as
being of MLVAgenotype 62, and antibiotic susceptibilities
of the isolate were indistinguishable from those of the
other human anthrax patients confirmed nationwide since
October 4, 2001 (4,8). Retrospective and prospective sur-
veillance did not identify any additional human or animal
anthrax-related illness (9,10).
Patient Epidemiologic Investigation
The patient lived in a central Connecticut town with a
population of 9,821 persons (2). She lived alone in a ranch-
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ly wooded lot on a residential side street approximately
one third of a mile from the state road. The home entryway
was readily visible to homes across the street. 
She spent most of her time inside her home reading or
watching television and did not spend time outdoors. She
did not shop or cook; family and friends provided food and
household supplies. Her home was clean and well-organ-
ized. She had no hobbies requiring woolen items (e.g.,
knitting or crocheting), goat hair, or leather. A family
member assisted her in paying bills, reading unfamiliar let-
ters, and handling bank transactions. In the 60 days preced-
ing symptom onset, her only visitors besides family and
close friends were her church pastor, approximately 25
Halloween trick-or-treaters, and two persons from her
cleaning service. No unusual visitors or solicitors were
noted by friends or neighbors. 
She did not drive; family and friends provided trans-
portation. She was always accompanied when outside the
home and limited her time away from home to <2 hours to
prevent fatigue. Her activities outside her home consisted
of weekly hair salon appointments, routine physician vis-
its, lunch outings with friends, weekly church attendance,
visiting another church for a Christmas fair, and voting at
the town hall. No unusual persons or occurrences were
noted by those who accompanied her during these outings.
When she was compared with the 10th case-patient
with inhalational anthrax in New York City, limited simi-
larities were found: both were women >60 years of age,
lived alone in clean homes, wore hats, and had a bottle of
the same brand of perfume (which was sampled for the
presence of B. anthracis). They had no brand of medica-
tion, physicians, hobbies, social networks, or geographic
area in common.
Patient Environmental Investigation 
Cultures of all 258 samples and 84 personal effects
from the patient’s home were negative for B. anthracis.
The 181 samples from the indoor air spaces she visited in
the 60 days preceding symptom onset (including 11 restau-
rants, seven cars, five physician’s offices, five homes of
neighbors or close friends, two churches, a bank, a hair
salon, and a public building) also cultured negative for B.
anthracis. Cultures of the 17 samples from the selected
outdoor locations and 16 nasal swabs from visitors to her
home also were negative for B. anthracis. 
Postal Epidemiologic Investigation 
We recovered 29 letters from her home postmarked
after September 1, 2001: 7 canceled first-class letters and
23 presorted bulk letters. These 29 letters likely did not
represent the entire number of letters she had received
since September 1. Of the six first-class letters, only one
was postmarked after October 9 (October 26). All first-
class letters were sliced open along the top border of the
envelope, whereas bulk letters, mainly solicitations or
credit-card offers recovered from her garbage, had been
torn in half. Samples from all 29 recovered letters were
negative for B. anthracis.  
The Morgan and West Palm Beach PDCs did not save
records of outgoing mail for the period of interest. The
Trenton and Brentwood PDCs did not send first-class let-
ters directly to her address during October 9 to October 21
(date after which both facilities were closed because of B.
anthracis contamination). Five first-class letters from the
Trenton PDC and three first-class letters from the
Brentwood PDC were sent to her postal carrier route dur-
ing this time. Two of the letters from the Trenton PDC
were processed approximately 3 hours after the Daschle
and Leahy letters and on the same canceling machine.
None of these letters were delivered to an address on her
street, none coincided with a first-class letter to the patient,
and none were recovered.
USPS data from the Southern Connecticut PDC
showed that eight first-class letters, only one of which was
recovered, had been sent to her address during October 9
to November 13, 2001. All eight originated in Connecticut
and were canceled at the Southern Connecticut PDC. 
While examining the USPS data, we identified and
recovered a first-class letter (letter A) that was sorted in
the Trenton PDC 283 letters (approximately 15 s) after the
intentionally contaminated letter to Senator Leahy. Letter
Awas processed in the Southern Connecticut PDC and the
patient’s local post office and delivered to an address
approximately 4 miles away on a different mail carrier
route. Three separate moist swab samples taken from the
outside of letter A’s envelope yielded 1, 3, and 7 CFU of
B. anthracis, respectively. Cultures of moist swab samples
from the inside of the envelope and its contents were neg-
ative for B. anthracis. The sorting machine in the Southern
Connecticut PDC that first processed letter A could not
read the postnet code. Therefore, letter A was removed
from the automated system and hand-sorted. Eight moist
wipe and vacuum cleaner samples from the sorting
machine in the Southern Connecticut PDC that first sorted
letter A were negative for B. anthracis by culture as were
36 moist swab and vacuum cleaner samples from the
home that received letter A, including the box that the let-
ter was stored in, the letters stored next to letter A, the
home’s mailbox, and mailboxes from homes on either side
of the home.
Overall, the Trenton PDC processed approximately 5
million letters between October 9–October 16, and the
Brentwood PDC processed 13 million letters between
October 9 and October 21, when they were closed. Of
these, approximately 1.1 million letters were processed at
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Daschle and Leahy passed through, half of which were
bulk letters (Table 1). 
Of 33 bulk mailing companies that sent letters through
the Trenton PDC, 19 sent letters to Connecticut; 17 of
these companies had no records of bulk letters sent to the
address of the patient or her close contacts. 
Postal Environmental Investigation 
The Southern Connecticut PDC is approximately
350,000 square feet. It has 11 machines to cancel and code
letters originating there and 18 machines to sort letters
originating in and arriving at the Southern Connecticut
PDC. Each letter-sorting machine has 48–52 columns of
permanent collecting bins arranged in columns four bins
high (Figure 2). Flats and parcels are processed by differ-
ent machines located in different areas of the PDC. The
facility is highly computerized and processes approximate-
ly 3 million letters, flats, and parcels daily.
Forty-one (7%) of 590 samples from the Southern
Connecticut PDC yielded B. anthracis. The strain was
indistinguishable from that of the bioterrorism-related iso-
lates (9). All of the positive samples were from 4 (31%) of
the 13 final sorting machines. Sorting machine 10, normal-
ly used to sort bulk letters as they arrived at the facility,
was heavily contaminated. A vacuum sample from the
vibrator-feeder area yielded anthrax spores, estimated as
2.9 million B. anthracis CFU in 0.53 g of paper dust col-
lected. Wipe samples of 30 (58%) of 52 columns of bins
from this machine yielded B. anthracis. Of 65 swab, wipe,
or vacuum samples collected from the sorting machine
(no. 6) that completed the final sort of letters that included
the patient’s mail carrier route, only the wipe sample taken
from the column of bins that held sorted letters for the
patient’s postal carrier route were positive for B. anthracis
(Table 2). Cultures of the 63 environmental samples taken
at the local post office and 485 nasal swabs from employ-
ees working at the Southern Connecticut PDC or the local
post office were negative for B. anthracis.
Discussion
This report describes the epidemiologic and environ-
mental investigation of a case of inhalational anthrax in a
94-year-old woman from rural Connecticut. Molecular
subtyping and antibiotic susceptibility testing of the isolate
from blood culture demonstrated that it was indistinguish-
able from the other bioterrorism-related isolates, establish-
ing a link to the cases that were caused by the mailing of
intentionally contaminated letters (3,7,8). Surveillance
efforts indicate that this was an isolated case in
Connecticut and not a sentinel for a larger exposure (9,10).
Although a direct exposure was not found, our investiga-
tion indicates cross-contaminated bulk mail as the source
of her exposure. 
Of the 11 cases of bioterrorism-related inhalational
anthrax, 9 with known exposures had incubation periods of
5 to 13 days (15,16). Because 36 days had passed since the
last known intentionally contaminated letters (Daschle and
Leahy letters) were postmarked and the onset of the
Connecticut woman’s symptoms, we considered many
nonpostal potential sources of exposure: aerosolized
release in her community; an intentional release at her
home; and tampering of products, including pill bottles,
inhalers, foods, spices, or misting devices. We also looked
for similarities with the unexplained case in New York
City. Extensive surveillance, epidemiologic investigation,
and environmental sampling found no evidence to support
these hypotheses. 
We also wanted to determine whether the patient
received an intentionally contaminated letter similar to the
Daschle and Leahy letters, which mainly resulted in
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Table 1. Volume of letters processed after the Bacillus  anthracis–containing letters to Senators Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy in 
the Trenton, New Jersey,and Brentwood, District of Columbia, processing and distribution centers during two intervals, October 2001 
Trenton, NJ  Brentwood, DC 
Type of letter  Oct. 9–16  Oct. 10
a  Oct. 9–21  Oct. 10
a 
Bulk letters  ~3,000,000  ~500,000  ~6,000,000  ~500,000 
First-class letters  ~2,000,000  ~500,000  ~7,000,000  ~ 600,000 
First-class letters to Southern Connecticut PDC
b  20,451  3,645  24,181  3,836 
First-class letters to patient’s local post office  39  9  66  9 
aOct. 10 represents the volume of letters processed during the 24-hour period after the letters to Senators Daschle and Leahy were processed. 
bPDC, postal processing and distribution center 
Figure 2. Diagram of a letter-sorting machineinhalational anthrax cases, rather than an intentionally con-
taminated letter similar to the New York City media letters,
which resulted solely in cutaneous cases (15).
Environmental sampling of the Trenton and Brentwood
PDCs and the Hart Senate Office Building, which
processed or received the Daschle and Leahy letters, indi-
cated widespread contamination in these locations (13,17).
In contrast, environmental sampling showed only focal
contamination in the Southern Connecticut PDC and no
contamination in the patient’s home, making receipt of a
letter similar to the Daschle or Leahy letters unlikely. In
addition, we identified no anthrax illness among postal
employees at the Southern Connecticut PDC or the local
post office (1,4). Although no cases of anthrax-related ill-
ness were identified in employees of the Hart Senate
Office Building, early administration of postexposure
chemoprophylaxis (17) likely prevented this. 
The recovery of a cross-contaminated letter demon-
strates the plausibility of cross-contaminated letters reach-
ing their destination with demonstrable amounts of spores
still on the envelope. Though B. anthracis was readily cul-
tured from the outside of letter A’s envelope, we found no
evidence to indicate letter A was actively shedding or
transferring spores at any point in Connecticut. This
demonstrates that spores can remain on or embedded in the
outside surface of an envelope without measurably con-
taminating the environment. 
The 36-day gap from the Dashle and Leahy letters to
the onset of the patient’s symptoms suggests that her incu-
bation period may have been longer than that seen with the
first nine bioterrorism-related inhalational cases. In addi-
tion, the lack of any environmental evidence of B.
anthracis spores in her home or any of the known locations
she visited in the 60 days preceding illness suggests that
her exposure dose was much lower than the 50% lethal
dose cited in the literature (18). While we cannot exclude
the possibility of an additional unrecognized intentional
release, our findings are consistent with evidence from
studies of inhalational anthrax in nonhuman primates (19). 
We believe the patient received either a bulk letter that
was directly cross-contaminated in the Trenton PDC or a
bulk letter that was secondarily cross-contaminated in the
Southern Connecticut PDC. Alternatively, we cannot
exclude the possibility that the patient was exposed to a
bulk letter secondarily cross-contaminated by one of the
eight first-class letters sent to her postal route that were
processed in the Trenton or Brentwood PDC after the
Daschle and Leahy letters. The fact that she tore her bulk
letters in half provides a possible mechanism for releasing
a limited number of spores embedded in the surface of the
envelope into her breathing space, a number that was too
small to detect during environmental sampling of her
home. 
The possibility of cross-contaminated letters as a cause
of anthrax illness has been postulated (20). Although
cross-contaminated letters are potential sources of expo-
sure and the risk of critical B. anthracis exposure through
cross-contaminated letters is low, our investigation did not
support earlier assumptions. Specifically, we found no evi-
dence to indicate that a first generation cross-contaminat-
ed letter (letter A) was actively shedding or transferring
spores at any point in Connecticut. Thus, cross-contami-
nated letters can have markedly different levels of cross-
contamination and potential to shed spores. An individual
assessment is necessary to determine the magnitude of
risk.
If we assume that the case in Connecticut, and possibly
the unexplained case of inhalational anthrax in New York
City (21), resulted from exposure to cross-contaminated
letters, the overall risk for inhalational anthrax from cross-
contaminated letters appears very low. Approximately 2
million pieces of mail passed through the Trenton and
Brentwood PDCs during the first 24 hours after the
Daschle and Leahy letters contaminated these facilities,
and approximately 18 million pieces passed through
before the facilities were closed. This conclusion is consis-
tent with the expectation that the majority of letters would
not be heavily cross-contaminated and that only a limited
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Table 2. Number of positive and total samples  by sampling location and date, regional processing and distribution center—
Connecticut, 2001 
Sampling location 
Nov. 21 positive 
total (%) 
Nov. 25 positive/ 
total (%) 
Nov. 28 positive/ 
total (%)  Dec. 2 positive/total (%) 
Letter-sorting machine 4  0/0  0/0  1/12 (8)  1/48 (2) 
Letter-sorting machine 6  0/3 (0)  0/ 2 (0)  0/22 (0)  1/48 (2) 
Letter-sorting machine 10  0/0  0/0  4/ 8 (50)  30/52 (58) 
Letter-sorting machine 11  0/1 (0)  0/0  1/8 (13)  3/52 (6) 
All letter-sorting machines (n=14)  0/6 (0)  0/4 (0)  0/99 (0)  0/0 
All letter-canceling machines (n=11)  0/10 (0)  0/8 (0)  0/34  (0)  0/0 
All flats-processing machines (n=4)  0/8 (0)  0/18 (0)  0/4 (0)  0/0 
All parcel-processing machines (n=4)  0/10 (0)  0/2 (0)  0/4 (0)  0/0 
Other locations in regional PDC  0/27 (0)  0/25 (0)  0/21 (0)  0/0 
aAlthough multiple sampling techniques were used, exact locations were not sampled in a manner that would allow comparison of results by sampling techniques. 
Therefore, all types of samples are listed as a composite total. PDC, processing and distribution center. number of anthrax spores might remain on an envelope by
the time it reaches its destination. 
If low-dose exposure occurred through the mail,
numerous persons might have had such exposures. Why
illness developed in the Connecticut patient and not in oth-
ers is unknown, but the reasons might include her habit of
tearing mail in half before disposal, her advanced age, her
history of obstructive lung disease, and her use of inhaled
bronchodilators (3). If a future mailing of B. anthracis
spores is recognized, persons could be advised to open let-
ters in a well-ventilated area, avoid tearing envelopes, dis-
card envelopes after opening, and wash hands after han-
dling envelopes (9). 
The finding of the approximate equivalent of 3 million
spores from a vacuum sample on one sorting machine
underscores the importance of maintaining the revised
postal facility cleaning procedures geared to minimize
aerosolization of dust (12). Before the mailing of inten-
tionally contaminated letters, sorting machines were rou-
tinely cleaned by using compressed air. After investigators
recognized that aerosolization of spores during cleaning
might have contributed to inhalational anthrax cases
among postal workers, vacuum cleaners with HEPA filters
replaced compressed air cleaning of sorting machines
(1,4,13). 
A number of key limitations exist to this investigation,
however. First, we do not know the threshold for detecting
spores in the environment. The absence of positive cul-
tures in the home and other places sampled in her town
does not exclude the presence of B. anthracis spores in
these locations. Nonetheless, locations that processed or
received intentionally contaminated letters had widespread
contamination (13,17). Also, because the patient’s home
was frequently vacuumed and dusted, measurable amounts
of spores could have been removed during cleaning. We
tried to assess this by testing contents of vacuum cleaner
bags but were still unable to obtain positive cultures.
Second, because we were unable to completely trace bulk
letters, we do not know if she actually received any bulk
letters that passed through the Trenton PDC. Third, the
investigation began >1 month after anthrax spores were
introduced into the postal system. Thus, certain potential
environmental evidence might have disappeared by the
time our investigation began. 
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